Currency Boards, Expectations and Inflation Persistence by Carlson, J. A.
Purdue University
Purdue e-Pubs
Purdue CIBER Working Papers Krannert Graduate School of Management
1-1-1997




Follow this and additional works at: http://docs.lib.purdue.edu/ciberwp
This document has been made available through Purdue e-Pubs, a service of the Purdue University Libraries. Please contact epubs@purdue.edu for
additional information.
Carlson, J. A., "Currency Boards, Expectations and Inflation Persistence" (1997). Purdue CIBER Working Papers. Paper 126.
http://docs.lib.purdue.edu/ciberwp/126





Center for International Business Education and Research
Purdue University
Krannert Graduate School of Management
1310 Krannert Building
West Lafayette, IN 47907-1310
Phone: (765) 494-4463
FAX: (765) 494-9658
Currency Boards, Expectations and Inflation Persistence
by John A. Carlson and Neven T. Valev
Purdue University
Abstract
Adopting the exchange rate as a nominal anchor for monetary stabilization has
proved costly in a number of countries as inflationary inertia produces severe real
exchange rate appreciation. What causes infla~ion persistence? Complementary to
existing explanations such as staggered contracts and low credibility, we note that the
introduction of a new monetary rule, such as a fixed exchange rate reduces inflationary
expectations immediately to the target level only if all agents understand the implications
of the rule. We solve a simple model in the style of Barro-Gordon (1983) to trace the
implications of heterogeneity among agents in their ability to evaluate the new monetary
rule. The predictions of the model find support in data obtained from a survey on
inflationary expectations conducted in Bulgaria immediately before the introduction of a
currency board in that country.
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1. Introduction.
Monetary stabilization often involves the adoption of a nominal anchor. For open
economies, the most common choice, given its transparency, is to peg the nominal
exchange rate to the currency of a low-inflation country. Provided that the government
holds sufficient foreign exchange reserves and that tradables represent a sufficient portion
of total output, inflation and expectations of inflation should decline to the levels of the
reserve currency as soon as the exchange rate is pegged. The experience with adopting the
exchange rate as a nominal anchor, however, suggests that inflation only gradually
converges to low levels. It takes months, sometimes longer, before it declines to levels
close to that of the reserve currency. In the process, real exchange rates appreciate and the
countries start to run current account deficits. If the real appreciation is severe, eventually
a devaluation is inevitable and the peg of the exchange rate is often abandoned. What
accounts for the slow decrease in inflation?
The most commonly suggested explanation of inflationary inertia is the existence
of staggered contracts (Calvo (1983), Bruno (1991». Indeed, wage indexation, inherited
from a high-inflation period, has been singled out as the main reason for real appreciation
in a number of countries. Abolishing wage indexation, however, along with the
introduction of a pegged exchange rate in some countries (Argentina in 1991, Israel in the
mid 1980's) has not produced an immediate drop of inflation to single digits, indicating
that there could be additional reasons for inflation persistence. I
As an alternative (or a complementary) explanation, inflation may persist because
of insufficient confidence in the viability of the fixed exchange rate regime. Low
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credibility produces expectations of devaluation and inflation which are transformed into
nominal interest rate and commodity price premiums.2 Thus, the speed with which
inflation declines depends on the success with which authorities convince the public in
the viability of the fixed parity. To achieve that goal, stabilization plans often involve
more than the fixing of the exchange rate. Special institutional arrangements may be
introduced in order to enhance the credibility of the stabilization plan. Currency boards
are examples of such institutional arrangements.
Currency boards are institutions that replace central banks and ensure that
domestic currency can be purchased on demand at a fixed exchange rate.3 The fixed level
of the exchange rate can be altered only by a Parliamentary vote and, in addition,
domestic money is fully backed by foreign exchange reserves held by the government.
Currency boards thus introduce a rule of monetary policy characterized by transparency
and high (political) costs to deviation and, hence, are expected to bring a high degree of
credibility to the stabilization plan. However, the recent experience of Estonia (1992) and
Argentina (1991) shows that even with currency boards inflation declines slowly. Why
would inflation not decline immediately if wages are not indexed and the fixed exchange
rate seems viable at least for a few years?
Note that the introduction of a new monetary rule consistent with low inflation
reduces inflationary expectations only if agents understand the implications of the rule. It
is plausible that agents in the economy differ in their ability to evaluate the new monetary
rule and to incorporate that understanding into the formation of inflationary expectations.
t See Obstfeld (1995), Dornbush et aI (1995), Bruno (1991), Fischer (1986) for a discussion of these issues.
2 See Obstfeld (1995).
3 See Schwartz (1993) for a discussion on the history and operation of currency boards.
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Some agents may lack such ability and, instead, use lagged inflation to form expectations.
Thus, when a new monetary rule is introduced, some agents incorporate it in the
formation of their expectations, i.e. they form rational expectations while others form
adaptive expectations. We adopt a Barro-Gordon (1983) framework to trace the
implications of such heterogeneity among agents. We show that the introduction of a new
monetary rule consistent with low long-term inflation does not immediately reduce
inflationary expectations and inflation to long-term levels. Howsver, agents with rational
expectations hold lower inflationary expectations than agents with adaptive expectations.
Inflation persistence is directly related to the proportion of agents with adaptive
expectations. We also show that the future introduction of a new monetary rule affects the
choice of current inflation. In particular, current inflation may decrease in anticipation of
such an event.
We test some of the implications of the model using the results of a survey on
inflationary expectations in Bulgaria conducted immediately before the introduction of a
currency board in that country. In that survey, respondents were asked to provide their
inflationary expectations for the following year conditional on the introduction of the
currency board as well as their inflationary expectations if a currency board were not
introduced. The study is unique in the sense that it captures a very specific moment. First,
the introduction of a currency board is an event with very low frequency. Second, the
survey was carried out immediately before the introduction of the currency board but after
the legislation and all parameters of the board were publicly announced. In this sense,
there was no uncertainty about the level at which the nominal exchange rate will be fixed,
about the members of the board or about the fiscal position of the government.
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The implications of the model find support in the data. We used level of education
to differentiate agents with respect to their ability to evaluate and thus incorporate the
new monetary rule in the their expectations. We assumed that agents with higher
education level should possess a stronger ability to form rational expectations. Given that
a currency board is introduced, agents with higher education level (more with rational
expectations) expect lower inflation than agents with lower education level (more with
adaptive expectations). However, if a currency board were not introduced, the ability to
evaluate the new monetary rule should be irrelevant. We find that education does not
explain differences in expected inflation given that a currency board is not introduced.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In the next section, we trace the
implications of heterogeneous population in a simple model in a Barro-Gordon (1983)
framework. In sections 3 and 4, we discuss the survey data and present our findings. We
conclude with final remarks.
2. Monetary policy with heterogeneous agents.
Output Yt (all variables in logarithms) differs from its natural level by an amount
determined by the real wage (wt-Pt):
(1) Y, =Y- (WI - P,) - U,
where ut is an i.i.d. supply shock with mean zero and variance d. Inflation 1Ct is defined
by:
(2) Te, =P, - P,-l
Before observing ut' wages are set to keep output at its natural level:
(3) W, = EI_IP,
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Agents are heterogeneous in the way they form inflationary expectations. A
proportion (} of all agents form adaptive expectations:
which yields:
(5) E/'_IPt =Pt-I + 1rt_1
The remaining (l-fJ) agents form rational expectation. Denote their expectation of
the price level by Et~IPt' The nominal wage is given by:
Define the monetary authorities' loss functi~n Lt as:
where Yt is the level of output targeted by the policymaker. By substituting (6) into (1)
and (1) into (7). we write the loss function as:
where 1r~t =Et~IPt - Pt-I is expected inflation by agents with rational expectations and
kt=Yt - Y is the difference between the target and the natural level of output.
Mter observing the nominal wage (6) and the shock Ut• the government chooses
inflation Trt to minimize:
(8) minn ffJiE(L .It)
t i=O t + I
where f3e [0.1]. We reduce (8) to a two-period dynamic programming problem:
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Assuming that kt+i=k for all i we rewrite (8') as4:
(8")
Monetary authorities choose inflation to achieve a balance between its inflation
and output objectives. Provided that some agents form adaptive expectations (e > 0) there
is an additional cost to raising inflation in period t in terms of the objectives in period t+1
as inflation in period t is built into expectations of inflation for period t+1 (third term in
(8")).
The first order condition with respect to 1r1 yields:
(9) tr =(1- 8)(a + 8)2 tret + 8(a + 8)
2
trt-l + k[(a + 8)2 - f3a8(1 + a)] + (a + 8iut
t (1 + a)[(a + 8)2 + f3a82]
A rational expectations equilibrium implies that tret = Et_1trt which yields expected
inflation by agents with rational expectations:
(10) tret = 8(a + 8)2 tr 1+ (a + 8)2 - f3a8(1 + a) k(a + 8i + f3a82 (1 + a) t- (a + 8)3 + f3a82(1 + a)
To obtain a solution for actual inflation, we can substitute (10) into (9). However,
to get some insight into the dynamics of the problem we begin our analysis in Section 2.1
with the algebraically simpler case when /3=0. Then, in Section 2.2, we relax that
assumption.
2.1. Last year in office.
In this section we assume that the future is discounted completely, Le. f3=O.
Expression (10) reduces to:




9n,_1 + kne, =_:......:....-
a+9
Substituting (11) into (9) with /3=0, yields actual inflation:
9(1 + a)n'_1 + (1 + a)k + (a + 9)u,n =~_--<...~-~---'~~-~~
, (l+aXa+9)
Long-term inflation with 1rt=1r'.l and u,=O is kla. There are several interesting
points about (11) and (12). Note from (12) that inflation is correlated across periods if
some agents form adaptive expectations:
(13) arr, =_9_~O
dn,_1 a+9
Thus, a shock in period t-1 that raises inflation in period t-1 will also raise
inflation in period t. In that sense the effect of shocks spills over into subsequent periods.
If monetary authorities lack any resolve to fight inflation (a=0), the process of inflation
contains a unit root (arr,1 arr,_1 =1). If a >0, the effect of a shock diminishes over time
(arr, I dn,_1 < 1). In terms of inflation persistence, note that, coming from a period of high
inflation (n>kla), the speed with which inflation declines is inversely related to the
proportion of agents with adaptive expectations. However, while inflation declines,
agents with rational expectations hold lower inflationary expectations than agents with
adaptive expectations:
(14) an -kn _;re = ,-I > 0
'-1' L)a+17
That difference increases in the weight authorities place on fighting inflation (a).
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Finally, coming from a period of high inflation (1Dkla), expected inflation by
agents with rational expectations increases in the proportion of agents with adaptive
expectations:
(15) an/ =ant_I - kt >° ifa8 (a + 8)2
In other words, agents with rational expectations expect higher inflation because
they are aware of the existence of more agents with adaptive expectations.
•
We now look at the above dynamics from a different perspective. The monetary
authorities of a high inflation country, in an effort to stabilize inflation, adopt the
preferences of some other, low-inflation country at time T. The shift in preferences is
defined as
(16) at ={~* if t<Tift~T
where a*>a.. The long-run inflation consistent with a* is kla*<kla. To fix ideas,
assume that Trt_J=kla and uT+i =0, i ~ 0. How rapidly does inflation reach its new long-run
level following the adoption of the new preferences?
Expected inflation for period t by agents with adaptive expectations is kla.
Expected inflation (which equals actual inflation since ur=0) by agents with rational
expectations can be found from equation (11) with Trt_J=kla to be:
(17) neT = k 8 + a {> k / a *
a8+a* <k/a
Clearly, inflation does not immediately decrease to long-term levels by the introduction of
the new monetary rule. As noted earlier, the speed of convergence is directly related to
the proportion of agents with adaptive expectations. At the introduction of the new
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monetary rule, agents with rational expectations expect lower inflation than agents with
adaptive expectations. The wedge between expectations increases in (a*-a), the
magnitude of the shift in policy preferences. Yet, agents with rational expectations expect
higher than long-term inflation because they are aware of the existence of agents with
adaptive expectations. If the new monetary rule were not introduced, both type of agents
expect Ida. This can be seen from (17) with a*=a.
2.2 First year in office.
In this section, we investigate how the dynamics of inflation change when {3>0.
With {3>0, in setting current inflation, monetary authorities take into account its effect on
future inflationary expectations as current inflation is built into the inflationary
expectations of agents with adaptive expectations.
Expression (10), rewritten below, is expected inflation by agents with rational
expectations:
1rel = 8(a +8i 1r + (a + 8)2 - /3a8(1 + a) k
(a +8i + /3a82{1 + a) 1-1 (a + 8)3 + /3a82(I +a)
Note that agents with rational expectations expect lower inflation the higher {3 is.
In other words, greater "concern" of monetary authorities about the future effects of
current inflation is built into the rational agents' expectations.
a21relFurther, inflation is less persistent when {3 is larger ( < 0). Monetary
a1rt-la/3
authorities are more willing to reduce current inflation in order to reduce inertia in
inflationary expectations.
The monetary authorities' response to supply shocks also depends on {3. From (9):
10
r,-
(18) J;r, (a + 0)2
au, =(1 + a)[(a + oi + a,B02]
Larger f3 implies a smaller increase in inflation for a given supply shock u,.
Finally, in the spirit of our discussion in the previous section, let a stabilization
effort by the monetary authorities consist of adopting a greater weight on inflation in the
loss function at time HI. The two-period dynamic programming problem (8'') with at=a
(8"')
and yields expected inflation by agents with rational expectations:
(10') O(a *+0)2 (a * +0)2 -,Ba *0(1 + a *);r~, = ;r + k(a * +0)2(a + 0) +,Ba * 02{1 + a *) ,-I (a * +0)2(a + 0) +,Ba *02(1 + a *)
With [3>0, inflationary expectations incorporate both the current and the future weights on
inflation in the monetary authorities' loss function.
Let Trt_l=k/a. and ut=O. If a new monetary rule is not introduced, expected
inflation (by all agents) and actual inflation in period tis k/a.
To see the effect of a future monetary rule on current inflation, substitute k/a for
Trt-l in (10') and subtract k/a from 1ft:
(19) k ,Ba*O{1+a*Xa+O)k;rt, - - =- ~---'--:;-~---"-'----'----
a a(a *+Oi(a + 0)+ ,Baa * 02(1 + a *)
With [3>0, current expected inflation is lower in anticipation of the introduction a new
monetary rule.
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2.3 Some empirical implications.
Based on the model, in the empirical part of the paper we test the following
hypotheses:
1. Expected inflation immediately following the introduction of a new monetary rule are
higher than the long-term level of inflation consistent with that rule for both agents
with rational and agents with adaptive expectations.
2. Agents with rational expectations hold expectations of lower inflation than agents
with adaptive expectations.
3. If a new monetary rule is not introduced, the ability to evaluate such a rule does not
explain differences in inflation expectations.
3. Description of the survey
A survey was conducted in Bulgaria during the last two weeks of June 1997
immediately before the introduction of a currency board on July Ist.5 By mid June, the
fixed level of the exchange rate and the members of the currency board were announced.
The size of the survey (l022 respondents) is considered representative for the country. It
was conducted as part of a larger survey on poiitical attitudes and current economic
conditions. We used two of the questions from the survey. In the first, each respondent
was asked about her/his expectation of the average monthly inflation over the following
year if a currency board is introduced and, in the second, about her/his expectation of the
average monthly inflation over the following year if a currency board is not introduced.
Monthly rather than annual rates of inflation were chosen because at that time, after a
s Appendix 2 provides a brief background on the economic conditions in Bulgaria prior to the introduction
of a currency board.
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period of high and unstable inflation, price movements were generally discussed and
quoted in the media in terms of monthly rather than yearly changes.
Respondents also indicated their age, education level, gender, place of residency,
political attitudes and current occupation. Income data were provided by too few
respondents to be usable in the estimations.
4. Results.
Approximately 30% of the respondents did not provide an inflation forecast. With
few exceptions, respondents provided either forecasts for inflation with and without a
currency board or none at all. The estimates of a probit model in which the decision to
provide a forecast is explained by demographics are reported in Table 1. Respondents
with higher education, respondents who are employed, male and younger respondents are
more likely to provide an inflation forecast.
In Table 2, we show the mean expected monthly inflation with and without a
currency board. We report the means for the overall sample as well as for some
demographic subsamples. Also included is the percent of respondents who provide a
forecast between 0 and 10% (low inflationary expectations compared to the mean). For
completeness, we also report coefficients of variation calculated as standard deviation
divided by the mean.
Average expected monthly inflation with a currency board is 24.96%. Without a
currency board, average expected monthly inflation is 50.36%. With a currency board,
50% of all respondents expect inflation within the 0-10% range and without a currency
board, 27% of respondents expect inflation in the 0-10% range. Clearly, the introduction
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of a currency board is consistent with lower expected inflation but does not by itself
lower expectations to desired levels (the inflation of the German mark).
According to the model, the differences in expectations stem from the better
ability of some agents to evaluate and incorporate the new policy model into their
expectations. We use the level of education to pr~xy for that ability. If a new monetary
rule is not introduced, that ability is irrelevant and should not explain differences in
expected inflation. Indeed, Table 2 shows that the level of ~pected inflation with a
currency board is inversely related to the level of education of respondents. Respondents
with higher education expect monthly inflation of 21.04%, respondents with high school
education expect monthly inflation of 22.92% and respondents without high school
education 29.92%. Such inverse relationship, however, is not observed for expected
inflation without a currency board.
Table 3 provides evidence of the statistical significance of the effect of education
on inflation expectations. We report the coefficient estimates of four equations where
expected inflation is explained by demographic factors. In equations (1) and (3) expected
inflation with and without a currency board is explained by education, gender and age, Le.
what we view as the basic demographic differences and in equations (2) and (4) we add
employment status, political attitudes, and place of residency. Expected inflation with a
currency board decreases in education. Expected inflation without a currency board, on
the other hand, is not significantly explained by education.
The estimates reported in Table 3 also suggest that supporters of the party
introducing the currency board expect lower inflation (compared to the average) with a
currency board but not so if a currency board is not introduced. Perhaps, in the spirit of
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Ito (1990), that effect can be attributed to "wishful thinking" by the segment of
population that is politically interested in the successful implementation of the currency
board. We also find that female respondents expect lower inflation (compared to the
average) with a currency board but not so without one. However, we find it difficult to
formulate a plausible explanation for that effect.6
5. Conclusion.
Many stabilization programs based on an exchange -rate peg result in real
exchange rate appreciation, current account deficits and, potentially, costly devaluations.
It is essential to understand why inflation does not decline to low levels immediately
following the introduction of a monetary rule which is consistent with low inflation.
Complementary to arguments advanced before -- wage indexation and low credibility --
we suggest that agents in an economy may differ in their ability to understand, evaluate
and thus incorporate the new monetary rule in the fonnation of their inflationary
expectations. In other words, agents may differ in their ability to fonn rational
expectations. In a Barro-Gordon (1983) framework, we trace the implications of such
heterogeneity Also, we use survey data on inflationary expectations conducted in Bulgaria
immediately before the introduction of a currency board in that country to test some of the
predictions of the model. First, inflationary expectations are only partially reversed by the
adoption of a new monetary rule consistent with low inflation. Second, agents with
rational expectations hold expectations of lower inflation than agents with adaptive
6 Jonung (1981) reports the results of a survey on perceived and expected inflation in Sweden. He finds that,
for 1977, perceived inflation among female respondents is significantly greater that perceived inflation by
male respondents. That difference is attributed to the greater increase in food prices during that year
compared to the increase in the overaIl consumer price level: "As women are responsible for the major
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expectations. If a currency board were not introduced, however, the ability to evaluate
monetary rules does not explain differences in inflation expectations.
share of the food purchases within Swedish households. they are more exposed to movements in food prices
than men." With respect to expected inflation. however, such differences are not observed.
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Table 1
Demographic determinants of the decision to provide an inflation forecasts
Probit analysis.
Dependent variable =I if a respondent provided an inflation forecast, and 0 otherwise
Survey data. June 1997, Bulgaria
Notes: ML eslimates. Z.stalisliCS 10 parentheses. ••• SIgnificant at the 0.01 level, •• slgmficant at the 0.05 level. •
significant at the 0.1 level.
Dependent variable =1 if the Dependent variable =1 if the
respondent provided a forecast of respondent provided a forecast of
monthly inflation with a currency monthly inflation without a
board. currency board.
ootherwise ootherwise
Independent Variables ( 1 ) (2 )
Education (0 if primary. 1 if 0.06** 0.07***
secondary. 2 if higher education) [2.10] [2.68]
Age (0 if < 31 -0.06** -0.04**
1 if31-S0. 2 if>SO [-3.2S] [-2.18]
Gender -O.OS* -0.07**
(l if female) [-1.79] [-2.39]
Employment 0.04 0.06*
(l if employed) [1.12] [-1.7S]
Vote (l if today would vote for O.OS 0.02
the party in office) [1.S3] [0.58]
Capital (1 if resident of the -O.OS -0.02
capital) [-1.S3] [-0.49]
Pseudo R2 0.030 0.033





Survey results. June 1997, Bulgaria
Mean Coefficient Percent of Number of
of Variation answers in Respondents
(a) 0-10%
range (b)
Whole Sample Inflation with currency board 24.96 1.75 50 691
Inflation without currency board 50.36 1.46 • 27 701
Female Inflation with currency board 21.07 1.09 50 341
Inflation without currency board 47.64 1.42 27 342
Male Inflation with currency board 28.74 1.96 51 347
Inflation without currency board 53.25 1.45 28 356
Respondents Inflation with currency board 21.04 1.04 55 107
with higher Inflation without currency board 45.62 1.44 27 109
education
Respondents Inflation with currency board 22.92 1.86 54 353
with high school Inflation without currency board 53.72 1.49 30 366
education Difference
Respondents Inflation with currency board 29.92 1.62 49 231
without high Inflation without currency board 47.21 1.38 41 226
school education Difference
Below 31 years Inflation with currency board 26.39 2.15 50 189
of age Inflation without currency board 52.77 1.44 26 183
Difference
31--50 years of Inflation with currency board 25.69 2.15 51 246
age Inflation without currency board 54.34 1.37 27 258
Difference
Above 50 years Inflation with currency board 23.20 1.17 50 256
of age Inflation without currency board 44.71 1.31 45 260
Difference
Note: Each respondent was asked to proVIde a forecast of the averoge monthly mflallon rote over the followmg year
conditional on introducing or not introducing a currency board.
(a) Coefficient of variation is calculated as standard deviation divided by mean.




Demographic determinants of expected inflation
Survey data. June 1997, Bulgaria
Notes: OLS. T-stal1sl1CS In parentheses. ••• sIgnIficant at the 0.01 level• •• sIgnIficant at the 0.05 level. • sigruficant at
the 0.1 level. Dependent variables is expected monthly inflation.
Expected Expected Expected Expected
inflation with a inflation with a inflation without inflation without
currency board currency board a currency board a currency board
Independent Variables (1) ( 2 ) 0( 3 ) (4)
Education( 0 primary, 1 secon -5.33** -6.08** -0.30 1.29
dary,2 hi,gher education) [-2.17] f-2.03] [-0.07] [0.25]
Age (0 if < 31 -2.91 -2.06 -4.95 -4.68
1 if 31-50, 2 if>50 [-1.39] [-1.24] [-1.27] [-1.28]
Gender -7.26** -7.12** -5.54 -5.59
(l if female) [-2.25] [-2.21] [-1.00] [-1.01]
Unemployed 5.56 0.02
(l if unemployed) [1.45] [0.01]
Capital (l if resident of the -1.13 -8.49
capital) [-0.32] [-1.43]
Vote (I if today would vote -5.61 * 2.93
for the party in office) [- 1.68] [0.53]
Constant 36.11 36.82 58.42 59.51
[8.96] [8.34] [8.35] [7.51]
R2 0.016 0.023 0.004 0.007




Appendix 1. Derivation of E(Lt+1It).
(AI) minlr,+1 E(L,+llt) = E{[tr,+1 - (1- 8)tr~t+1 - 8tr, - k - u'+lf + atrt+12It} =
=[tr'+l - (1- 8)tr~'+1 - 81r, - kf + atr'+1 2 + (72
The first order condition yields:
(A2) (1- 8)tr~l+l + 8tr, + ktr - ->-----''------!--
1+1 - 1+a
A rational expectation equilibrium implies that 1ft=Et_]1rt which yields expected inflation
by agents with rational expectations:
(A3) 81r +ktr~,+l=-,-'-
8+a
With ut+]=O, 1ft+]=1rt+]+ To obtain the value function for period t+1, we substitute (A3)
into (AI):
(A4) ( )
_ a(l+a)( )2 2E L,+llt - ( )2 81r,+k +(7
a+8
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Appendix 2 . A brief background on the financial crisis in Bulgaria.
Figures 1 and 2 show the monthly inflation rate and the level of the exchange rate
of the domestic currency vis-a.-vis the USD from April 1996 to 1997. Monthly inflation
stayed at around 15-20 percent over that period with a peak of 43 percent in January 1997
and 242 percent in February 1997 giving an average of 36 percent for the period. The
exchange rate increased from around 70 leva for one USD (a level maintained for two
years), to 2050 in February and back to 1600 in the end of March. For a few days in the
beginning of March, it peaked at 3000 leva for one USD and at that time most of the
economy was dollarized.
The crisis began with the failure of several major banks in the first months of
1996. By the beginning of 1997, that had been followed by runs on almost all banks and
currency flight. The foreign exchange reserves of the central bank decreased from
USD1236 million in the beginning of 1996 to USD380 million in the beginning of 1997.
In December, 1996, with the initiative by the IMF, the idea of a currency board
was publicly introduced. Following Parliamentary elections in April 1997, the legislation
for a currency board was passed and the system was introduced on July 1st, 1997. The lev
was fixed at the level of 1lev=loo0 German marks which was approximately the current
market price. The period leading to the introdqction of the currency board can be
characterized by an increased level of uncertainty and uneasiness with the possible effects
of the currency board on unemployment, the banking system, government expenditure,
etc. Nevertheless, public objections were few.
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Figure 1. Monthly percentage change of
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